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James Lau


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James Lau
  • Title: Doctor
  • Position: Lecturer - Department of Accounting and Corporate Governance
  • Qualifications: BCom (Hons), BBA BCom-Accg, CA

Contact Details

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Areas of Expertise

  • Corporate Reporting
  • Family firms
  • Corporate governance
  • Dividend policy

Professional Certifications:

  • CA (Chartered Accountant) with The Institute of Chartered Accountants


  • Bachelor of Commerce - Accounting (Honours): Accounting (Macquarie University)
  • Bachelor of Business Administration/Bachelor of Commerce - Accounting: Administration and Accounting (Macquarie University)


journal toggle icon open Refereed Journal Articles

  • Lau J. (2010) "Defining listed family controlled corporation - An agency theory perspective", Journal of Enterprising Culture, Vol. 18, No.4. pp 377-397
  • Lau J.C., Sinnadurai P. and Wright S. (2009) "Corporate governance and CEO dismissal following poor performance: Australian evidence", Accounting and Finance, No. 49, Vol 1, pp 161 - 182.

Student information

  • Load: PhD Student Part Time
  • Principal supervisor:

    DoctorElaine Evans

  • Associate supervisor:

    DoctorSusan Joy Wright

  • Date of submission: 17/02/2015
  • Thesis title: Dividend and Cash policy in founder and family firms
  • Abstract:

    This research investigates whether the presence of controlling founders and families has significant impact on the level of cash holdings, and their implications on firm value. The agency cost of cash holdings in founder firms is arguably less severe than family firms, due to founders' economic incentives, strong psychological commitment and superior knowledge, whereas family firms are exposed to adverse selection and moral hazard as a result of altruism. Results indicate that founder firms hold a significantly higher level of cash holdings than family firms. In addition, there is a positive interaction effect between founder management and cash holdings on firm value, suggesting the presence of founders as managers helps to mitigate the agency costs of cash holdings.


  • Corporate Financial Reporting

Research Interests

  • Corporate Governance