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Ka Wai (Stanley) Choi

  • Title: Mr
  • Position: PhD Student - Department of Applied Finance and Actuarial Studies

Contact Details


journal toggle icon open Refereed Journal Articles

Choi, K. W., Chen, X., Wright, S., & Wu, H. (2014).Analysts' Forecasts Following Forced CEO Changes. Abacus, 50(2), 146-173. doi: 10.1111/abac.12026

other toggle icon open Other

  • The Role of Enforcement Strategy in Disclosure Regulations: Evidence from Market Liquidity (Sole author)
    • Presented in AFAS PhD Workshop 2014. The earlier version of this paper was presented in AFAANZ Doctoral Symposium 2013 (Perth) and the Faculty-held Higher Degree Research Exposition 2013.
  • Deterrent Effects of Expanding Disclosure Regulation Sanctions: Evidence from Analysts' Information Environment (with S. Wright, XM. Chen and H. Wu)
    • This paper won the Best Paper Award in Macao International Symposium on Accounting and Finance 2013 (Macau); and was presented in Inaugural Sirca Young Researcher Workshop 2012 (Sydney) and Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics – Doctoral Consortium2013 (Hong Kong).

Professional Membership

  • Associate CPA of: CPA Australia, Sydney Australia

Student information

  • Load: PhD Student Full Time
  • Principal supervisor:

    A/Prof Sue Wright

  • Associate supervisor:

    Lecturer Charlene Chen

  • Adjunct supervisor:

    Adjunct supervisor: Dr Steven Wu– ANU

  • Date of submission: 17/08/2015
  • Thesis title: The Role of Enforcement Strategy in Disclosure Regulations
  • Abstract:

    The importance of enforcement of security regulations/accounting standards has long been recognized in the literature. This thesis explores the role enforcement strategy plays in securing corporate compliance.  Using the switch to the responsive enforcement strategy [Ayres and Braithwaite 1992] of the Australian Continuous Disclosure Regime as a natural experiment, this thesis examines the effects of the implementation of such enforcement strategy on market liquidity and the information environment. A difference-in-difference design is adopted using New Zealand firms as the control group to better isolate the effects of the enforcement strategy from other concurrent economic and technological developments. The collective evidence shows that expanding disclosure regulation sanctions –as part of the enforcement strategy– helps improve market liquidity and information environment. Additional analyses reveal that the results are likely to be due to reduced information asymmetry, and are attributable to the enforcement strategy rather than the levels of enforcement intensity and regulatory resources. These findings extend the enforcement literature by documenting the important role enforcement strategy plays in improving corporate compliance, and advance our understanding of the optimal form of enforcement. The findings are of particular relevance for regulators with tight budgets in which simple enforcement strategies such as expanding sanctions offer a potentially more cost-effective way to secure compliance than actively making expensive law enforcements.


Lecturing (Postgraduate Courses):

  • AFIN867 International Financial Management (2014 S1, 2014 S2) – Unit Leader
  • ACST852 Finance and Financial Reporting (2013 S2)
  • ACCG893 Research Methodology in Accounting (2013 S1)

Tutoring (Undergraduate Courses):

  • ACCG224 Intermediate Financial Accounting (2011 S2, 2012 S1, 2012 S2, 2013 S1, 2013 S2, 2014 S1, 2014 S2)
  • ACCG350 Financial Statement Analysis (2012 S2, 2013 S1)
  • ACCG100 Accounting 1A (2011 S1)
  • ACCG106 Accounting Information for Decision-Making (2010 S2)

Research Interests

Financial Accounting, Disclosure Regulation Design and Effectiveness, Capital Markets, Corporate Governance